Abstract
Introduction
A central issue for this article is how we can better understand the EU"s ability to constitute open frontiers and create a climate for reconciliation in conflict situations.
Much of the existing literature on the EU, conflict resolution and border dynamics, has been premised on the assumption that the nature of the border determines EU intervention and the consequences that flow from this in terms of EU impact i.e. a linear or causal relationship. This article aims to transcend this literature through assessing how domestic interpretations influence EU border transformation. Fusion of the literature on EU bordering impact and the EU"s normative projection in conflict resolution, it is suggested, captures in a more nuanced way precisely how differentiated interpretations of the EU as a force for good (Pace 2007 ) amongst conflicting parties hinder or enable the EU"s ability to create a more fluid, networked (non) border in conflict situations (Walters 2004; 679-682) . To this end, it is argued that the Cyprus conflict, with insider and outsider dynamics, provides a salient case study of how EU borders are co-constituted and more specifically, how such borders emerge out of a dynamic political process.
The Cyprus issue represents a unique and challenging problem given the involvement of the two communities in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, a candidate for EU accession.
with Turkey a candidate for accession, and the Turkish Cypriots institutionally excluded and unable to fully benefit from EU initiatives designed to enhance their economic welfare. The EU, despite being embroiled in the dispute, has been constrained in transforming the (de facto) EU hard border that separates the two communities in Cyprus. A significant reason for this was the approach of the Cypriot government under the nationalist President, Tassos Papadopoulos (2003 Papadopoulos ( -2008 . His modernist conception of the border led him to pursue a "European solution"
3 with the goal of securing a tight federal solution (unitary and sovereign Cypriot state) and the rule of the majority community. This was sustained by using a narrow definition of the EU"s normative construction to legitimate and reinforce his position -and a strategy of manifest manipulation, both inside and outside the EU milieu.
Furthermore, progress within the primary mediating process under the UN umbrella was slow in this period. Despite agreement between the leaders of the two communities under the "Gambari process" (8 July 2006) to accelerate resolution efforts 4 , and agreement on a common framework 5 , the reality was more reflective of a "creeping divergence" (Cyprus After Accession 2007) . This political dynamic placed
The next section will provide an overview of the theoretical literature on the EU and conflict transformation and differentiate the approach to be utilised in the paper.
Section three will provide an overview of EU bordering practice in the pre-accession period, with an emphasis on the critical post-1999 period, when Turkey was accepted as a candidate for EU accession. Section four will assess how interpretations of the EU as a force for good by conflict parties in the Cypriot dispute, and the strategies pursued by them, affected EU bordering practice in Cyprus in the Papadopoulos era . This section will focus on the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and
Turkey. It will not include an analysis of Greece, as despite it being a significant actor and one of the three guarantor states, since 1999 and during the period in question, it distanced itself from the position of the Cypriot government and chose to engage only at a minimal level diplomatically, with the Cyprus issue (i.e. Greece has been more withdrawn and has thus had less impact on the overall dynamics of border transformation in Cyprus) . Section five will provide a brief analysis of the impact of the more moderate Christofias government, elected in February 2008. The concluding section will draw out the main implications of the analysis.
The EU, Conflict Transformation and Bordering Practices
Many scholars have been engaged in explaining and providing a more complex understanding of the EU"s role in conflict transformation. Such analyses have focused on enlargement, and the conditions under which the EU"s power of attraction can facilitate conflict transformation (Christou 2004 (Christou , 2002 , as well as Europeanisation as a conflict resolution tool (Coppieters et al, 2004) . Such a perspective emphasises the EU"s potential as a third party actor and framework in meditating disputes, influencing conflict dynamics through conditionality or socialisation (Tocci 2004; Coppieters et al 2004) . Tocci (2007; 17) has also promoted the idea of conflict resolution through passive enforcement of rules that emanate from the EU. She argues that conceptually, this is distinct from conditionality, in that it is not based on changing behaviour based on reward and punishment, but rather, on an in-built system of incentives and legally based rule-bound cooperation.
Others have focused on both the direct and indirect effects of the EU actions in conflicts (Hill 2001 . For example, in relation to direct effect Diez et al highlight a "compulsory" impact, referring to the employment by the EU of carrots and sticks related to membership prospects and association, in order to induce a change of behaviour amongst the (elite) actors in the conflict, towards resolution.
They also identify a "connective impact", which relates more to the EU"s impact within the societal/civil society dimension, through both its material resources but also its normative influence. In relation to indirect effect, they identify an "enabling" impact and a "constructive" impact. The former refers to the potential ideological and normative impact of the EU framework in terms of legitimising alternative options for foreign policy and resolution of conflict at elite level, and the latter, on the EU"s discursive ability in terms of transforming identities at societal level and desecuritising the conflict.
Although such an approach provides valuable insight into the strengths and limitations of the EU as an actor and framework in conflict situations, it has also led to a linear (non-dynamic) analysis of the EU"s impact in terms of border transformation. In addition, it has been less successful, as pointed out by Rumelili (2007; 109) , in sufficiently addressing the "interactive dimension of conflict resolution, particularly the question of how the EU can simultaneously influence the insider and outsider states to promote conciliatory policies on both sides". She suggests that the most fruitful way of achieving this is through a systematic evaluation of the EU"s bordering practices, which are seen as a significant condition for the EU"s impact beyond its boundaries. Rumelili (2007; 109) posits that EU borders can be understood within a multidimensional framework -and drawing from Smith (1996) , distinguishes between the EU"s institutional, physical and identity borders ( In terms of the outsider state or community, a hard EU border first, restricts severely the EU"s compulsory impact because effectively, it impedes the development of dense institutional relations and other bilateral and transnational links from evolving beyond a low-level dynamic. Second, it negates the enabling impact, as the legitimacy of the EU and its policies, as well as identification with the EU, is low.
Finally, hard borders also have a negative (non-constructive) effect in terms of connective and constructive impacts in the outsider state. It is difficult to engage in transnational or trans-community interaction and contact with a hard border, and it also reinforces "the conflict-enhancing self versus other identity distinctions between the conflict parties by superimposing on them the more authoritative distinction of European versus non-European" (Rumelili 2007: 111) .
Conversely, with EU open frontiers, impact is much stronger and the EU"s ability to positively influence movement towards resolution of a conflict is enhanced. In this sense, the compulsory impact on the outsider state is stronger both in terms of the increased density of institutional relations and increased links between governments and communities, creating a greater sense of common identity between the inside state and the outside state. The EU"s enabling impact is also enhanced through more positive identification with the EU and its policies at community and governmental level, thus providing a more legitimate basis for implementing changes emanating from the EU. Finally, there is a more effective connective and constructive impact through open EU frontiers. Enhanced contact across all levels builds mutual trust and cooperation, and is underpinned by shared EU values and an interest in resolving the conflict. It also weakens the fractious and divisive discourses of self versus other in the two communities thus promoting a conflict reducing rather than conflict enhancing milieu (Rumelili 2007; 108-12) .
In terms of the insider state, a hard EU border allows the empowerment of hardliners at domestic level that wish to utilise the EU milieu, and the instruments within it, against the outside community or state, in order to promote a divisive rather than a reconciliatory approach. This in turn, creates a perception within the outside state or community of a non-neutral EU, captured by the insider state for the pursuit of its own interest. Such a perception further reinforces a negative identification with the EU amongst elites and societal actors in the outsider state or community.
Conversely, with EU open frontiers there is more likely to be a reconciliatory approach and a greater possibility that the conflict will be transformed through being part of the same EU community. Such open frontiers, it is argued, allow for the empowerment of more moderate domestic actors and the incapacitation of "maximalist" elites seeking to utilise the EU to secure concessions from the outsider state or community. Indeed according to Rumelili (2007; 112) (Agnew 1999; Newman 2000; Paasi 1996 Paasi , 2003 Newman and Paasi 1998; Ruggie 1993) 7 . Within modernist approaches those at the margins, local conflict actors in this case, are largely ignored in their ability to constitute borders.
The suggestion here is that conflict actors, whilst closely linked to and defined by the centre (the EU) to which they are marginal, also exist as sites of action themselves (Shields 1991; Parker and Armstrong 2000; Parker 2008 ).
In this context it is argued that the more recent literature exploring the concept of the EU"s normative power (Manners 2002 (Manners , 2006 Of course, domestic perceptions of EU interventions and the EU"s normative power in conflict situations have been addressed in the academic literature (Rumelili 2008 (Rumelili , 2004 Pace 2007; Diez and Pace 2007) . This article proposes to add to this through a case study of Cyprus, and a synthesis of the work on EU bordering practice and the EU"s normative power, in order to enhance our understanding of why (van Houtum 2005) and how borders can be (re-and co-) constituted in conflict situations. In other words, the main contribution of this article is on how conflict parties can constitute EU conflict borders -not just on how the EU can provide the necessary incentives to determine the actions and change the behaviour of conflict actors. It also attempts to add to the existing approaches by suggesting that there are various (ideal type) strategies that conflict parties can adopt based on their interpretation of EU norms, which also impact on the EU"s ability to transform hard borders into open frontiers, through the different logics at play.
Diagram 1 here
Drawing on and adapting the work of Parker (2008; 13) , several strategies can be identified that are salient to conflict parties in exerting influence in the context outlined above (see Diagram 1). The first of these strategies is that of manifest emulation, which is interpreted here, as a situation whereby a conflict party identifies with the EU as a force for good and all the EU norms that underpin this. Under these circumstances the EU would be expected to have a positive influence, with conflict parties more likely to change adapt their behaviour in line with EU action and the integration framework. The second strategy is that of manifest manipulation by conflict parties. This refers to a strategy that embodies different scenarios: acceptance of the EU as a force for good and a rejection of EU norms; acceptance of the EU as a force for good, and manipulation of EU norms to enhance rather than ameliorate conflict; and finally, a situation where EU norms are accepted by conflict parties, but the image of the EU as a force for good is only shared by some conflict parties (Diez and Pace 2007) . These scenarios suggest reinforcement of conflict enhancing dynamics and a negative EU influence on conflict party behaviour. The final strategy is that of manifest incompatibility/rejection of the EU as a force for good and all EU norms, and constitutes a situation whereby the EU is "powerless" to transform conflict situations through direct or indirect means.
Of course these strategies are only analytical "ideal types" and it is recognised that there is a great deal of "fuzziness" and "overlap" in reality. However, such ideal types provide us with analytical benchmarks and starting points, from which, complexity can be understood through empirical analysis of case studies such as Cyprus. This, in turn, can provide us with further evidence of the forces that can determine EU border dynamics and indeed, the opportunities and limitations of the EU to pursue strategies that will lead to EU integrated frontiers characterised by a networked (non) border (Walters 2004 ) -where there exists a dynamic of deterritorialisation; a diminishing relevance of (spatial) lines of division; and differences between self and other are reduced.
Finally, certain points of clarification are needed before proceeding to the analysis.
First, the suggestion in this article is not that conflict parties agreeing on an EU "values" script (manifest emulation) is a panacea for resolving conflict (Diagram 1 -point b), but that this is minimum requirement for the prospect of transformation in the fluid process of (socially) constructing a reconciliatory climate between the conflict parties. This is even more salient in the case of Cyprus where the UN is the primary and more credible interlocutor for resolving the conflict. In the same vein, it is not to suggest that a EU "open frontier" (non-networked border) is anything but an ideal type, the central dynamics of which offer the possibility of creating a climate for transforming conflict in a sustainable way. Recent evidence does suggest that there are both points of agreement and disagreement between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots communities on the nature of the EU border that should be created (see Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci 2008) , but that this does not necessarily imply such views are in any way static 9 . In this way, offering a prescription based on such views at any one point in time would be to miss the point of the argument being made here -that border conflict transformation is a dynamic process where conceptions of the "right" 10 . Second, although a key assertion is that a more dynamic picture of EU bordering practice in conflict transformation can be achieved through the framework outlined, it is also acknowledged that the "context" can change at any particular point in time depending on the forces and logics to be found within the conflict space 11 being analysed. Finally, purpose of this article is to illuminate, in a more nuanced way, how agents can determine and constitute borders in conflict situations. It is therefore to highlight and analyse the interactive (co-constitutive) dimension of the process of EU bordering and how it can be understood in conflict transformation. In doing this, it seeks to move away from the idea of conflicts existing "out there", with only the "correct" strategy of intervention needed through the appropriate EU logic in order to bring about transformation and reconciliation 9) .
EU Bordering Practice and Cyprus 1999-2004
A logical starting point for an analysis of the Cyprus conflict is the impact of the EU"s policy of exclusion prior to the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, when
Turkey was granted candidate status. Here, Greece, as the insider state since 1981, sought to exert its influence in Greek-Turkish disputes (including Cyprus) through the leverage afforded to it by membership and a strategy of manifest manipulation.
Indeed, the EU was seen a force for good by Greek elites and EU norms were used to constrain movement towards an open frontier, empowering hardliners in the Greek government and marginalizing alternative voices on the Greek-Turkish relationship that sought long-term rapprochement through supporting Turkish orientation towards the EU. Furthermore, such a policy provided for relative success in foreign policy terms for Greece, and a legitimate platform that was used to secure domestic support against Turkey, which was portrayed as "non-European other", and threat to the Greek state and its security interests.
Conversely, within Turkey, Greece"s policy of negative conditionality meant that any EU policy intervention in Greek-Turkish relations was interpreted as evidence of further European reluctance to include Turkey, and the capture of the EU by Greece to pursue its hostile agenda. In essence, the EU"s hard border with respect to Turkey, maintained because of the Greek strategy, served to create a perception amongst Turkish elites of the EU as a negative force that only escalated the conflict. The impact was the prevention, indirectly, of positive transnational links evolving between civil society, business and other interests. Moreover, it legitimated the securitised frame within which bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey were conducted and served to accentuate the othering of Turkey, adding, rather than alleviating, Turkish insecurity about its own identity and European orientation (see Rumelili 2007 Rumelili , 2008 for detailed analysis).
This Cyprus, as the insider state, aimed "to make the Cyprus problem a European problem…believing in this way that we can increase our possibilities of seeking a solution" (Interview, COREPER, 2006) . This meant manipulation of EU norms through the available mechanisms and tools, to achieve a "European solution" 19 . For
Tassos Papadopoulos, the strategy of manifest manipulation, reflected a belief that he had "received a state" on election and that he did not want to "deliver a community". 
The Turkish Cypriots
The new and ambitious FAR and DTR proposals raised the expectations of Turkish
Cypriots that perceived the EU to be "normatively" beneficial in Cyprus 
Conclusions
The purpose of this article was to focus not just on the cause-effect relationship between EU action and Cypriot conflict transformation, but also on the extent to which this can be influenced by differing interpretations of the EU as a normative force for good amongst conflict parties, and the strategies pursued by them. It has shown that despite Commission policy to influence border transformation in the post-flowing from the EU normative power construct in the pre-accession period was negated by a more conservative interpretation linked to what was perceived as an inconsistency relating to the EU"s normative projection towards Turkish Cypriots, and its inability to convert policy into effective action because of the manifest manipulation strategy of the "insider" Cypriot government. The consequence in
Cyprus was the inability of the EU to catalyse movement to more open institutional and physical borders and reinforce the European identity of the Turkish Cypriots that perceived the EU as a force for good. It also hardened the identity border between the EU and Turkey, further undermining the EU"s normative power (through conditionality) in the accession process and in relation to the Cyprus conflict, whilst also perpetuating rather than alleviating Turkish insecurity about its European orientation.
The election of a more moderate President in the south has led to a positive "local" On a theoretical and policy-making level, the case of Cyprus illuminates some important issues in relation to the EU ability to constitute and transform border conflicts. It highlights the need to understand in a more sophisticated way, how the EU as a normative power construct can have a positive bordering impact in conflict situations. In order to achieve this, further research is required to conceptualise the "stages of a conflict" (Çelik and Rumelili 2006) within which this is possible, how EU policies "fit" with local interpretations of the intervening actor, and at what point in the "cycle of intervention" EU action would be most effective (for this, see . On a broader level, it also points to the EU"s "logics of engagement" when aiming to transform borders, and the constitutive power of those outside as well as those inside the EU, to impact not just on the nature of the border the EU is attempting to reshape, but also on the identity of the EU as an international actor and the narrative that underpins its projection as a force for good in (re) ordering Europe. This is a particularly salient issue for future research on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (see Browning and Joenniemi 2008; Browning and Christou, 2008) which aims to create security and stability and resolve conflicts from the "outside", through offering predominantly, an extension of the EU physical border, without the requisite deep institutional and identity confirming benefits. Lordos (2005 . For an analysis of the Turkish Cypriot "yes" vote, see Bahcheli (2004) .
NOTES
9 Indeed what is implied is quite the opposite -that confidence building measures and the right incentives and dialogue can lead to the reconstruction of conflict borders (open borders).
10 See Delanty (2006) for a discussion on these dimensions of European borders. See Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci (2008) for detail on what is acceptable to Turkish and Greek Cypriots in this context. 11 The central analytical focus of this paper is on the "local" context, and whilst outside the remit of this article, it is important to recognise the "complexity" of such a context, especially in relation to the (re)
construction of the identity border in conflict situations through the lens of colonial practices and the colonial legacy of European Empire. For analyses of the Cyprus problem from these perspectives see Constantinou (2007) ; Kramsch (2006); and Boedeltje, F et al (2007) .
12 Potential membership also provided a normative framework through the acquis communautaire for implementation of the four freedoms.
more time for discussion of the critical aspects of the Annan Plan settlement.
19 In Greece the view was different to that of the Papadopoulos regime. The effects of the process of EU socialisation and the Greek-Turkish rapprochement triggered by changing domestic dynamics meant that Greek foreign policy, under Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, and Foreign Minister, George
Papandreou, underwent a transformation that led to a new strategy of manifest emulation of EU norms.
The result of this was a policy that unequivocally supported and encouraged Turkish membershipindeed the view from Greece was that a Turkey included within the EU would bring bilateral and regional benefits and facilitate the movement towards developing a more trusting basis for transnational cooperation across a range of issues. This also led to a divergence of opinion and gradual dissociation with the manipulation tactic pursued by the Papadopoulos regime. Greece"s support for Union was very much dependent on it changing its strategy of manifest manipulation and "fully complying with its European obligations" arguing that "full implementation also means full accession".
Greece has also iterated that the historical security framework of "guarantees" and "interventions" does not have a place in the EU, that the Annan Plan "belongs in the past", and that full normalisation of relations with Greece presupposed a solution to the Cyprus issue. To this end, Greece continues to lend its support to the intercommunal dialogue under the auspices of the UN, to allow a solution to be found by "Cypriots themselves", although many have argued that Greece should raise its profile and use its influence to greater effect inside and outside the EU to facilitate the normalisation of relations (and thus a more open EU frontier) between Cyprus and Turkey (Reunifying Cyprus, 2008; 23) . 31 Although the list of products that can be traded remains unchanged. The prohibition on animal products, which excludes honey and fish at present, remains in place. 32 This would not apply to cigarettes and alcohol.
